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Artemis Income Fund
Q3 2026 update

Published on 19 Oct 2026

Source for all information: Artemis as at 30 September 2026, unless otherwise stated.

Market review 

Like much of 2026, the third quarter was, to say the very least, eventful. Investors had much to contend with, from strong corporate earnings growth to spiralling AI capex, giant IPOs and unprecedented corporate debt issuance. As if that were not enough, bond markets were in an unforgiving mood. Longer-dated yields moved sharply higher in response to swelling inflationary pressures, better-than-expected economic growth and the ongoing deterioration of government finances. The latter raised questions about the creditworthiness of the US, the UK and France, in particular.

Performance

This was a disappointing quarter for the portfolio, which lagged the FTSE All-Share. Once again, some of the biggest beasts in the UK market performed best. Oil & gas – a longstanding portfolio underweight – benefited from higher oil prices. Meanwhile mining – another large sector in the UK market where our active weight is negative – performed well given continued enthusiasm for all things AI capex and the commodities required to facilitate it. HSBC shares posted another decent quarter and defence-adjacent Rolls-Royce and BAE Systems (all three are unowned) also rallied.

Concentration in the UK (as well as many other markets globally) looks elevated versus history. The top 10 stocks now account for 43% of the FTSE All-Share. The fund has around 20% of its capital invested here. At the risk of sounding like a broken record, we continue to believe – in the main – that the best prospective returns can be found outside the largest index constituents in the UK.

The advent of AI has cast a shadow over the prospects of certain companies and sectors. Naturally, this has induced a degree of anxiety amongst investors. It takes time to disprove a negative, so as fund managers, we are required to be more patient than ever. Encouragingly, the debate is maturing in some areas and there are signs the market is becoming more balanced in its assessment of AI’s longer-term impact.

One prevalent feature of modern markets is ‘baskets’: groups of companies used by hedge funds and ‘pod shops’ to express views on a particular theme. This is quite a blunt tool, in our observation. Baskets have been available for a while but latterly their use has been exacerbated by the ramifications of AI, spawning categories such as ‘AI losers’, ‘AI beneficiaries’ and ‘AI immune’. It is somewhat ironic that at a time when AI allows information to be used more deeply and intelligently, the stock market chooses to paint with a broad brush and trade these proxies.

Many of the largest companies in the UK have found their way into these AI-related baskets, which now call the shots in trading volumes and feed off shorter-term sentiment and earnings momentum – ephemeral factors when compared with longer-term valuation prospects. Share prices have run hard in many of these areas and we think valuations look full, particularly when compared with the fund’s portfolio. However, the fact remains that our below-market exposure to some of these large stocks and themes accounts for a material portion of our underperformance.


Three monthsSix monthsOne yearThree yearsFive years
Artemis Income Fund0.3%9.2%12.3%56.6%70.3%
FTSE All-Share index2.4%7.2%16.8%53.9%68.2%
UK Equity Income average3.6%10.8%16.2%47.7%53.0%

Past performance is not a guide to the future. Source: Lipper Limited/Artemis as at 30 September 2026 for class I distribution GBP. All figures show total returns with dividends and/or income reinvested, net of all charges. Performance does not take account of any costs incurred when investors buy or sell the fund. Returns may vary as a result of currency fluctuations if the investor's currency is different to that of the class. Classes may have charges or a hedging approach different from those in the IA sector benchmark.

Positive contributors

RS Group shares hit an 18-month high, supported by improving macroeconomic data in the US and an AGM trading update that highlighted a positive start to FY27 across all regions. Multi-year investments into technology and process improvements are beginning to manifest in business performance; thanks to the company's differentiated multi-channel offering, it is well placed to take share in what remains a highly fragmented industrial repair and maintenance market. As volumes recover, we think the company has plenty of ‘self-help’ levers it could pull to improve margins and returns, such as cutting costs and improving processes. We judge a 7% free cash-flow yield to offer attractive risk-reward.

EasyJet shares performed strongly as the battle to acquire the airline continued. US private equity firm Castlelake had four proposals rejected before easyJet agreed in principle to a sweetened offer in early July, only for Apollo to subsequently enter the race with a higher proposal, which the board has backed. Our view for some time has been that easyJet's shares are materially undervalued. They traded below the replacement cost of the company's fleet of aircraft even before attributing any value to easyJet holidays, its brand or its desirable slots at capacity-constrained airports. We are therefore reassured to see more widespread recognition of this value through Castlelake and Apollo's approaches.

Aviva shares were supported by a FY26 earnings release with much to like for investors. Operating profit grew by 24% and earnings per share (EPS) by 10% year-over-year. The company increased the interim dividend per share by 7%. Management reiterated confidence in the three-year targets set in 2025, including 11% annual EPS growth, as well as progress towards Aviva's business mix being 75% 'capital light' by 2028. We continue to believe Aviva's technology capability to be ahead of peers. This means the company should be able to capitalise on what is a material cross-sell opportunity: of Aviva's 25 million customers, only seven million currently have two or more policies. The stock offers a 6% dividend yield, which we believe is well placed to grow at mid-single digits over time and make a healthy contribution to total returns in the process.

Detractors

IG Group was the most significant stock-specific disappointment. The shares initially sold off (despite robust results) after the company announced the suspension of its share buyback programme and the $1.3bn (£1bn) acquisition of US sports prediction platform Underdog. We were not surprised by the negative reaction; IG's pattern of beating estimates, raising guidance and buying back shares was replaced with the uncertainty of an acquisition. Nevertheless, we thought the reaction was overdone. While there is regulatory uncertainty around prediction markets, Underdog doubles IG's US revenues and gives the company a foothold in an area of rapid growth.

IG’s shares then fell by around a quarter following an early-October trading update, in which the company forecast a 14% year-on-year decline in Q3 revenue. In addition, 'revenue retention’ (which measures how much of the spread from clients' trading activity IG retains as revenue) fell from a recent average of around 80% to approximately 70%. IG's market capitalisation has roughly halved since the acquisition of Underdog to around £3bn. In other words, investors are now assigning a negative value to the deal, while the multiple afforded to IG's existing business has also de-rated sharply despite several years of strategic and fundamental improvement.

We think this is an extreme reaction. Lower revenue retention reflects less supportive (meaning less volatile) market conditions, whilst changes to IG's hedging policy may depress retention in the shorter term but should support profitability over longer time horizons. What was lost in the announcement was that Underdog's revenues are growing at around 100% and we continue to believe its strategic direction is the right one. The shares now trade on around 7x earnings (and given close to 100% cash conversion, a free cash-flow yield of 13%) and the company has no debt. We therefore added to the position, given what we believe to be a significant improvement in the risk-reward. The company has a strategy day later in October which we will be following with interest; it is not impossible to imagine that sentiment may become more positive again in short order.

ITV agreed to sell its broadcast and streaming business to Sky in July. However, the regulatory assessment of this deal is expected to take some time, which is one of the reasons behind lacklustre share price performance. There has also been weaker guidance around advertising revenues, which is perhaps unsurprising given higher interest rates and increased macroeconomic uncertainty. We think the market is paying too much attention to that part of the business. Instead, our investment thesis focuses on ITV Studios, on which ITV will become a ‘pure play’, assuming the Sky transaction completes. ITV Studios is one of the largest production houses in the world. It has around £2bn in annual turnover and an enviable catalogue of 100,000 hours of content, spanning some of the world's most successful television productions, including the second series of The Gentlemen. We have argued for some time that ITV Studios is worth significantly more than the current market capitalisation of the group. We hope that focusing ITV on Studios will create a simpler story for investors and begin to unlock this value. A single-digit price-to-earnings (p/e) multiple and an 11% free cash-flow yield – as well as plenty of recent M&A in the sector – would suggest significant upside in the shares from here.

Imperial Brands shares fell to their lowest level since November 2024. The market reacted negatively to news of a significant headcount reduction in the US – reportedly numbering in the thousands – alongside comments from industry peers suggesting combustible volumes were declining more quickly than expected. We believe the weakness to be overdone. Right-sizing Imperial's cost base arguably makes sense in a structurally declining industry, while falling combustible volumes are hardly a new feature of our investment case and are factored into our analysis. We still believe a valuation of 7x next year's earnings and a 15% free cash-flow yield offer reasonable risk-reward, even with these volume declines in mind. We would also point to a 21% reduction in Imperial's share count over the past four years, which demonstrates the substantial cash generation of the business and the accretive impact of buying back shares at low valuations.

Activity 

We initiated a position in British American Tobacco, a company we have owned in the past but not for several years. The shares currently offer a dividend yield of around 6%, which we think can grow at mid-single digits over time. We judge BAT’s scaled portfolio of next generation products to be undervalued by the market, given their high growth and evidence that incremental margins are more attractive than combustibles.

Velo (nicotine pouches) has an industry-leading position in a rapidly growing category and we believe there is scope for BAT to take share from Philip Morris in the US (which, as an aside, trades on more than double [23x compared with 11x] the p/e multiple). We are under no illusions about the structural and regulatory risks faced by the tobacco industry, but our conclusion from revisiting the sector was that it makes sense to have exposure to both Imperial and BAT. 

We also added Standard Chartered to the portfolio. It has a strong foothold in fast-growing economies in Asia and an attractive position in wealth management. As wealth (which is capital light and generates higher returns) accounts for a larger proportion of Standard Chartered’s profits going forward, this should drive an acceleration in returns on tangible equity (ROTE). The shares have done well in recent years, but taking into account management’s ambitions of mid-to-high teen ROTE by 2030 and significant capital returns, then a price-to-book ratio of 1.3x does not look too demanding, in our view.

Finally, we have built a position in Marks & Spencer. Its food business is taking market share, while the clothing business has made substantial progress in recent years. Despite this better fundamental performance, a valuation of around 12x next year’s earnings does not imply particularly high expectations. The key from here will be execution. We think M&S has a long way to go with respect to investment in technology, warehousing, distribution and the broader infrastructure supporting the business. Put simply, the quality of the ‘front end’ customer proposition is some way ahead of the ‘back end’. If management can close this gap, we think better efficiency and continued sales growth could lead to accelerating returns on capital and cash flow over the medium term.

Outlook

This has been a difficult period of performance. As you would expect, we are asking ourselves where we could be wrong or what we might be missing – more so than ever before because this is a time of seismic, secular change. As such, the outcomes for being right or wrong are of a different order than in the past. Perhaps this goes some way towards explaining the volatility of performance. 

We are continually revisiting the investment cases of companies we own, but also those we do not. However, we cannot see enough value in the ‘big beasts’ that have driven index returns to justify moving capital away from stocks we judge to offer better upside. We suspect that latterly some demand for the largest names has been driven by risk management diktats rather than fundamentals.

More importantly, we believe the characteristics of the portfolio remain attractive. It trades on 11.7x forward earnings versus 12.4x for the FTSE All-Share and offers a 3.7% dividend yield compared with 3.1% for the market. This yield premium is the highest it has been for several years. On top of this, portfolio companies are buying back shares equivalent to approximately 3% of their aggregate market capitalisation each year. Dividends and buybacks combined therefore imply a cash return to shareholders of around 7% before allowing for any growth in earnings, dividends or cash flow. The portfolio also has better cash conversion than the market and, fundamentally, we believe its prospective returns are superior.

When assessing our portfolio from a top-down perspective, we note that over the past three years, revenue has grown nearly 4% faster than the FTSE All-Share and consensus estimates suggest that this trend of faster growth should continue. Widening revenue growth expectations of our portfolio relative to the market have emerged while the portfolio has de-rated in relative terms. We are somewhat reassured by the data that suggests our portfolio is both cheaper than the market and growing faster. Over time, we would hope that the shorter-term power of the ‘voting machine’ in markets will be outweighed by the ‘weighing machine’ and the attractive fundamentals of the businesses we hold will be reflected in valuations.

We also think there is an interesting opportunity for our companies to create value through M&A and industry consolidation. Higher interest rates have made this more challenging for private equity – at a time when pressure is building to distribute capital to investors. This should create opportunities for well-capitalised strategic buyers to acquire attractive assets at sensible valuations. Informa's latest acquisition is a good example: it is using its balance sheet and existing position of strength to further consolidate the global events industry and reinforce its position as the world's number one operator.

None of this means performance will recover in an instant; we have no insight into the shorter-term direction of markets and have learned over many years not to pretend otherwise. What we can do is remain disciplined, continually test our assumptions and allocate capital towards companies we believe offer the best prospective returns. After a difficult period, the combination of valuation, cash generation and shareholder returns on offer across the portfolio gives us confidence that sticking to our knitting remains the correct course of action.

FOR PROFESSIONAL INVESTORS AND/OR QUALIFIED INVESTORS AND/OR FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES ONLY. NOT FOR USE WITH OR BY PRIVATE INVESTORS.

CAPITAL AT RISK. All financial investments involve taking risk and the value of your investment may go down as well as up. This means your investment is not guaranteed and you may not get back as much as you put in. Any income from the investment is also likely to vary and cannot be guaranteed.

This is a marketing communication. Before making any final investment decisions, and to understand the investment risks involved, refer to the fund prospectus (or in the case of investment trusts, Investor Disclosure Document and Articles of Association), available in English, and KIID/KID, available in English and in your local language depending on local country registration, available in the literature library.

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Risks specific to Artemis Income Fund

  • Market volatility risk The value of the fund and any income from it can fall or rise because of movements in stockmarkets, currencies and interest rates, each of which can move irrationally and be affected unpredictably by diverse factors, including political and economic events.
  • Currency risk The fund’s assets may be priced in currencies other than the fund base currency. Changes in currency exchange rates can therefore affect the fund's value.
  • Charges from capital risk Where charges are taken wholly or partly out of a fund's capital, distributable income may be increased at the expense of capital, which may constrain or erode capital growth.
  • Income risk The payment of income and its level is not guaranteed.

Important information

The intention of Artemis’ ‘investment insights’ articles is to present objective news, information, data and guidance on finance topics drawn from a diverse collection of sources. Content is not intended to provide tax, legal, insurance or investment advice and should not be construed as an offer to sell, a solicitation of an offer to buy, or a recommendation for any security or investment by Artemis or any third-party. Potential investors should consider the need for independent financial advice. Any research or analysis has been procured by Artemis for its own use and may be acted on in that connection. The contents of articles are based on sources of information believed to be reliable; however, save to the extent required by applicable law or regulations, no guarantee, warranty or representation is given as to its accuracy or completeness. Any forward-looking statements are based on Artemis’ current opinions, expectations and projections. Articles are provided to you only incidentally, and any opinions expressed are subject to change without notice. The source for all data is Artemis, unless stated otherwise. The value of an investment, and any income from it, can fall as well as rise as a result of market and currency fluctuations and you may not get back the amount originally invested.