Source for all information: Artemis as at 30 June 2026, unless otherwise stated.
The Iran conflict dominated the market narrative during the second quarter. April was a tale of two halves: bonds initially started strongly, unwinding some of the March energy- and inflation-related weakness on hopes of peace in the Middle East. Optimism peaked around the middle of the month, just after Donald Trump and Iran’s foreign minister announced the Strait of Hormuz was open to all commercial traffic.
This optimism proved misguided for bonds, as the following week it became clear that the two sides were far from aligned on the actual re-opening terms. The fact that the US naval blockade would remain in place until negotiations were concluded constituted a breach of the ceasefire from an Iranian perspective and the Strait closed again the following day.
The impact on energy markets (which again marched higher) slowly became more entrenched, pushing out the futures curve. December 2026 Brent futures closed the month at $88 in a signal to markets that the pinch on energy prices would last much longer than many central banks first hoped. In effect, we had migrated closer to an ‘adverse’ scenario for central bank policy, with interest rate hikes becoming a realistic threat.
Oil prices fell significantly throughout May, supporting both equities and bond markets. Brent crude dropped almost 20% from $114 a barrel to $92. While a deal between Iran and the US was not achieved, investors continued to price in an eventual resolution to the conflict. Stocks were buoyed by stronger earnings and the backdrop of huge AI capex spending.
Throughout May, even when geopolitical news wasn’t supportive, it seemed as if credit spreads wanted to tighten and equities wanted to push higher. This was perhaps more indicative of money still left on the sidelines and FOMO rather than investor conviction that global supply chains could withstand the conflict.
By June, the conflict was almost in the rear-view mirror, with the emergence of a ‘memorandum of understanding’ between the US and Iran. Oil prices collapsed further and quickly approached pre-conflict levels. Growth indicators were already bouncing and the global economy appeared to have weathered the energy crisis well.
Kevin Warsh arrived at the Federal Reserve and in his first press conference practically killed off forward guidance. While the dot plot remained in place, it was clear the Federal Open Market Committee under Warsh would bring significant changes in communication.
UK politics came to the fore as Keir Starmer reluctantly stood down as prime minister, clearing the way for Andy Burnham to take control. Markets largely ignored the news, instead focusing on central bank decisions and the retreating conflict in Iran. The European Central Bank hiked rates by 25bps and by no means ruled out additional tightening. The Bank of Japan – well behind the curve with respect to policy normalisation – did eventually hike rates by another 25bps (perhaps under pressure from the new Takaichi administration), taking the policy rate to 1%.
The fund returned 3.5% during the quarter versus the IA Strategic Bond sector average of 2.6%.
| Three months | Six months | One year | Three years | Five years | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Artemis Strategic Bond Fund | 3.5% | 1.9% | 5.5% | 25.9% | 12.4% |
| IA Strategic Bond sector | 2.6% | 1.7% | 5.0% | 22.3% | 8.4% |
Past performance is not a guide to the future. Source: Lipper Limited, class I quarterly accumulation units in GBP to 30 June 2026. Sector is IA £ Strategic Bond NR. All figures show total returns with dividends and/or income reinvested, net of all charges. Performance does not take account of any costs incurred when investors buy or sell the fund. This class may have charges or a hedging approach different from those in the IA sector benchmark.
The portfolio participated in several new issues. In April, it purchased Westfield shopping centre bonds, which were rated AAA due to the quality of the underlying asset and low loan-to-value ratio. It also participated in an ENGIE issue, financing its acquisition of UK Power Networks. May purchases included new bonds from Barclays, DNB and Vonovia, while June additions comprised Morgan Stanley 5.432% 2032 and Scottish Hydro Electric 6% 2041 notes.
Investment grade secondary activity focused on relative value and risk-management opportunities. The portfolio switched between bonds from HSBC, The AA, Northern Powergrid and Aviva. It also moved from BPCE to another French bank, Banque Fédérative du Crédit Mutuel. Property exposure was re-established through CPI Property, while positions in Gatwick, Manchester and Heathrow airports were rebuilt as geopolitical risks receded. The portfolio also switched from Standard Life 7.75% 2053 into Legal & General 6.625% 2055, reflecting a more favourable assessment of L&G’s resilience to private market risks. Associated British Ports was sold in full following reports that majority shareholders were seeking to exit, creating uncertainty over future ownership and potential leverage.
High-yield new issue activity was broad. April purchases included Australian lithium producer PLS, auction house Sotheby’s, Schaeffler family holding company IHO, pharmaceutical capsule manufacturer Capsugel and specialist lender Together. The portfolio also participated in Mineral Resources’ refinancing, rolling its repaid 2028 bonds into new 2032 securities.
In May, the fund purchased a maiden seven-year issue from BASF Coatings, attracted by its market position, global footprint and substantial sponsor equity. June purchases included monitored-alarm operator Verisure, specialty chemicals producer Nouryon, a Birkenstock refinancing and a new US-dollar bond from underwater robotics and engineering specialist Oceaneering.
Secondary high-yield additions included Under Armour, Petco, Heimstaden and Premier Foods. INEOS Styrolution exposure was extended from 2029 into 2030 bonds, while exposure to cruise line Carnival was extended from 2031 into 2033, following its upgrade to investment grade.
The portfolio fully exited PetSmart, reallocating proceeds to Petco. It sold Levi’s in favour of better value in Under Armour and also exited Medline after its investment-grade upgrade had been fully reflected in valuations.
Reductions included FORVIA, Copeland, Samsonite, RBC Bearings, Herc, euro-denominated Belron bonds, Seaspan and MasterBrand, principally because of tighter valuations or a less favourable leverage outlook.
Throughout June, the Strategic Bond Fund reduced duration. It currently sits at 4.6 years, which is the lowest it has been over the past three years. The reason for the recent change? Policy rates are on hold globally and governments are not bringing budgets back into balance. If anything, they are getting worse.
Central banks are unlikely to give enough support via policy rate moves to keep 10-year yields from drifting higher. So the fund has been selling 10-year bonds while maintaining or increasing an overweight in shorter-duration bonds.
General themes within the portfolio are as follows:
The broad central banking community has moved from a rate-cutting cycle into an on-hold/hiking one and while this is not true everywhere, the general direction of travel is clear. Average G10 policy rates dipped below 3% at the start of 2026, but have since risen slightly and should remain above 3% for the next 12 months (barring external demand shocks).
The Bank of England is an outlier; it seems the most reluctant to hike and, if anything, could see lower policy rates over the next 12 to 18 months.
In other G10 countries, adjustments higher in policy rates are unlikely to slow growth and inflation. Fiscal policy is still supporting growth and no government appears to be serious about reducing spending. We are not suggesting political incumbents are indifferent to the ballooning deficit profiles many countries face. However, some politicians (look to the US) seem to think growing your way out of debt is a solution. Others feel they lack the political strength and party support to make the difficult choices necessary to rein in government spending. Meanwhile, voters seem oblivious to the perilous nature of government finances and the populist agenda adds downside risks.
Higher rates, therefore, are a realistic threat. Deficit financing and the deluge of government bond supply present stiff headwinds to lower long-end yields.
Economic fundamentals are sufficiently resilient that a slight adjustment higher in policy rates should not derail growth – unless there is an exogenous shock. And if a demand shock were to occur, investors would probably reach for duration.
We concede that there are plenty of reasons to be nervous about asset valuations, not least:
We continue to see the benefits of running a diversified strategy and we have more than enough flexibility to react to exogenous shocks, should they occur, both in terms of credit beta and duration flexibility.
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